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“POLITICAL QUESTIONS”: AN INVASIVE 
SPECIES INFECTING THE COURTS 
PHILIP WEINBERG† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent court rulings have distorted the hoary “political 
questions” doctrine into an excuse to evade the courts’ responsibility 
to decide serious justiciable issues in environmental law.  Unless 
overturned, these decisions not to decide important legal questions 
will carve out an unwarranted escape hatch and thwart effective 
judicial redress for environmental harms.  And, ironically, the 
weightier the legal issue, the more likely these courts are to dodge it. 
Last year, the federal district court in People of California v. 
General Motors Corp. (GMC) dismissed a public nuisance suit 
seeking damages from the major auto manufacturers for injuries to 
the state’s environment stemming from climate change.1  These 
asserted injuries included severe loss of water supply due to melting 
snow pack, increased risk of flooding, beach erosion, and forest fires.2  
The court concluded that this public nuisance action, no different 
from hundreds of others brought by states except for the higher 
stakes involved, was a political question and therefore beyond the 
court’s jurisdiction, since it “would have an inextricable effect on 
interstate commerce and foreign policy—issues constitutionally 
committed to the political branches of government,”3 and because 
there was, in the court’s view, no “manageable method of discerning 
the entities that are creating and contributing to the alleged 
nuisance.”4 
 
 † Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.  J.D., Columbia Law School, 
1958.  The author, co-author of Understanding Environmental Law (2d ed. 2007) and editor of 
Environmental Law: Cases and Materials (rev. 3d ed. 2006), is indebted to Delano Ladd and 
Craig Lutterbein (St. John’s University School of Law 2008 and 2009) for research assistance in 
preparing this article. 
 1. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
 2. Id. at *2. 
 3. Id. at *13. 
 4. Id. at *15. 
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Two years earlier, another federal court rebuffed a suit by 
Connecticut, New York, and several other states seeking to enjoin, as 
a public nuisance, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the nation’s 
five largest electric utilities, again citing their impact on global 
warming.5  In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (AEP) the 
court likewise found this to be a political question for similar reasons.6 
Yet other federal courts have more sensibly rejected political 
question defenses.  These courts have sustained actions for damages 
in a variety of environmental areas ranging from injuries from 
Hurricane Katrina7 to contamination of water supply caused by 
methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a pollutant added to gasoline to 
help comply with air quality standards.8 
II.  THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
The political question doctrine, or the reluctance of federal 
courts to decide political questions, has clear and fixed limits.  Its 
genesis lies in Chief Justice Marshall’s observation in Marbury v. 
Madison that “where the heads of departments are the political or 
confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the 
President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a 
constitutional or legal discretion, . . . their acts are only politically 
examinable.”9  But Marshall went on to rule for the Court that the 
government’s legal duty to furnish Marbury’s promised commission 
to serve as justice of the peace was not such a situation, that he had a 
“right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation 
of that right, for which the laws of this country afford him a 
remedy.”10  This decision, establishing the power of judicial review, of 
course veered off to hold the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
empowering the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in its 
original jurisdiction cases to be unconstitutional.11  The political 
question doctrine—actually grounded in the courts’ reluctance to 
invade the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and 
 
 5. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 6. Id. at 273. 
 7. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 8. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 10. Id. at 168. 
 11. Id. at 138. 
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legislative branches of government12—thereafter assumed a carefully-
circumscribed life of its own.13 
In another salient decision closer to our own day, Baker v. Carr, 
the Supreme Court ruled that claims that states’ failure to 
reapportion legislative districts over decades, resulting in gross 
inequality of representation due to the enormously varied population 
of districts, were not political questions.14  In so holding, Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, set forth the modern test for 
nonjusticiable political questions: are they issues “decided, or to be 
decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this 
Court,” or leading to “embarrassment of our government abroad,” or 
“policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are 
lacking”?15 
Illustrative of genuine political questions are the early cases 
seeking judicial rulings as to whether a state has the republican form 
of government assured by the Constitution’s Guaranty Clause.16  In 
Luther v. Borden, where the plaintiff contended that Rhode Island, in 
a comic-opera state of insurrection in the early 1840s, lacked a 
republican government, the Court found that issue to be one for 
which no judicial standard existed, and which, under the Constitution, 
must be resolved by Congress.17  Again, in Georgia v. Stanton, 
challenging the post-Civil War military occupation of the South,18 and 
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, a claim that 
enacting laws by popular initiative denied a republican government,19 
the Court rebuffed as political questions attempts to invoke the 
Guaranty Clause.20 
Similarly, some issues of foreign policy, such as whether a state 
of war exists between the United States and another country,21 or 
whether a treaty remains valid,22 have been ruled political questions 
 
 12. Id. at 166. 
 13. See generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1031, 1033–39 (1984) (discussing the history, scope, and rationale of the political question 
doctrine). 
 14. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). 
 15. Id. at 226. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 17. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). 
 18. 73 U.S. 50, 50–53 (1867). 
 19. 223 U.S. 118, 133–37 (1912). 
 20. See Stanton, 73 U.S. at 77–78; Pacific States Tel., 223 U.S. at 133. 
 21. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 22. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
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for the reasons advanced in Baker v. Carr.  But, significantly, claims 
that a treaty interferes with citizens’ rights protected under the 
Constitution are not political questions and will be decided by the 
courts, as in Kent v. Dulles23 (concerning limits on the right to travel) 
and Reid v. Covert24 (regarding whether an executive agreement with 
another country denies the right to jury trial to dependents of 
members of the Armed Forces serving overseas). 
One issue the Supreme Court has wrestled with over the past few 
decades is whether a challenge to the gerrymandering of 
congressional or state legislative districts—drawing districting lines to 
disproportionately benefit the party in power—is a political question.  
The practice has been challenged as a denial of equal protection as in 
Baker v. Carr, which, as noted, dealt with state legislatures’ failure to 
reapportion districts to reflect population shifts.25  The Court in 
subsequent decisions ruled that this practice denies equal protection, 
and enunciated the one person-one vote rule.26  Then in Davis v. 
Bandemer, a divided Court found gerrymandering to be justiciable,27 
though three justices dissented, considering the issue a political 
question.28  More recently, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,29 four justices ruled 
the practice to be a political question, while five found it justiciable.30  
Claims of gerrymandering on racial rather than partisan grounds have 
routinely been held justiciable and decided on equal protection 
grounds.31 
Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, summed up well the 
requirements of a nonjusticiable political question as “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion . . . .”32 
 
 23. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
 24. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 25. 369 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1962). 
 26. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–64 (1964). 
 27. 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986). 
 28. See id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 29. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 30. See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 317–55 (dissents by four justices). 
 31. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999). 
 32. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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Shortly after that decision, the Supreme Court resoundingly 
rejected a political question defense in Powell v. McCormack.33  The 
House of Representatives refused to seat Powell, elected by his New 
York constituents, after a House committee concluded he had 
“wrongfully diverted House funds.”34  The defendant, Speaker of the 
House, claimed this was a political question since the Constitution 
provides that “each House [of Congress] shall be the Judge of [the] 
Qualifications of its own Members.”35  But the Court, in an opinion 
written by Chief Justice Warren, held that the issue was not a political 
question since other provisions of the Constitution list precisely which 
qualifications the House may consider: age, citizenship, and state 
residence.36  And, with striking applicability to the recent climate 
change rulings, the Court added that the nature of our “government 
requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a 
manner at variance with the construction given the document by 
another branch.  The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may 
cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their constitutional 
responsibility.”37 
If true as to interpreting the Constitution itself, how much more 
apt is this holding to litigation interpreting statutes, like the Clean Air 
Act,38 that federal courts routinely construe? 
III.  ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS: POLITICAL QUESTIONS? 
In In re MTBE Products Liability Litigation, the court sensibly 
decided against dismissing as a political question a suit for damages 
for harm to public water supplies from methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(MTBE).39  The defendant chemical manufacturers argued that the 
suit involved “broad policy goals which can only be achieved by 
replacing MTBE with ethanol throughout the national fuel supply,” 
requiring the court to “balance the ‘relevant economic, 
environmental, energy and security interests’” at stake.40  But the 
court found that the defendants had “blurred the line between a 
determination of whether defendants are liable for water pollution 
 
 33. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 34. Id. at 492. 
 35. Id. at 513 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1). 
 36. Id. at 520–21 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2). 
 37. Id. at 549. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
 39. 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 40. Id. at 300. 
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caused by MTBE and a policy determination regarding the 
composition of the country’s fuel supply.”41  The court went on to 
distinguish Connecticut v. AEP, where it concluded that “Congress 
and the Executive had issued explicit statements” on climate change 
and “specifically refused to ‘impose limits on carbon dioxide 
emissions.’”42  That may have helped the MTBE court avoid the AEP 
ruling from the same district,43 but in the end, neither suit raises 
political questions under Baker v. Carr.44  The very failure of the other 
two branches of the federal government to act against climate 
change45 is precisely what frees the judiciary to do so, just as with 
legislative redistricting46 and, for that matter, public school 
segregation.47  As the MTBE court noted, as far back as Marbury the 
Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty . . . 
[is] the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury.”48 
Similarly, in Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., the 
court rebuffed a political question defense to a suit for damages from 
Hurricane Katrina, which the plaintiffs claimed were exacerbated by 
oil and gas exploration that reduced the protective qualities of 
wetlands in Louisiana.49  The defendants contended that since 
regulation of wetlands, which absorb much of the impact of coastal 
storms, is the province of the executive and legislative branches 
through enforcement of the Clean Water Act50 and similar state 
laws,51 there are no judicially manageable standards to weigh the 
coastal erosion that the destruction of these wetlands causes.52  The 
court sensibly ruled that judicially manageable standards plainly exist 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 301. 
 43. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 44. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 45. See e.g., Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change 
Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2–3, 45 (2005) (noting the development of climate change 
policy initiatives at the state level in response to federal inaction, and the valuable function the 
judicial process provides for state participation in the federal regulatory process “when there is 
stagnation in politics”). 
 46. See Baker, 369 U.S. 186. 
 47. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 48. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291, 299 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)). 
 49. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 688–89 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 50. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
 51. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW art. 17 (McKinney 2007). 
 52. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 682. 
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for determining the extent to which drilling in wetlands caused 
erosion, and to which the erosion worsened storm damage.53  It relied 
on a Fifth Circuit ruling rejecting an identical defense to a suit 
seeking damages for a fish pass, an artificially-created waterway, 
which allegedly contributed to coastal erosion.54  And, the court 
noted, the lack of judicially manageable standards defense is 
especially inappropriate in a tort action.55 
Although the Barasich court distinguished Connecticut v. AEP as 
a suit for an injunction,56 its logic applies to that case, and to GMC as 
well.  The fact that environmentally harmful activity is potentially 
subject to regulation by legislative and executive action in no way 
transforms it into a political question or strips the courts of authority 
to decide it. 
Again, in In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (In re 
Agent Orange), a suit by Vietnamese nationals seeking damages for 
exposure to Agent Orange, the defoliant applied by the United States 
military during the Vietnam War, the court, while dismissing the 
action on the merits, denied that it raised a political question.57  As 
the court noted, some actions involving international law issues have 
been dismissed as political questions, such as whether a president may 
abrogate a treaty58 and the extent to which treaties preclude suits for 
reparations by World War II and Holocaust victims.59  But, as In re 
Agent Orange pointed out, these do not apply to actions for injunctive 
relief or damages asserting legally recognizable injury, such as in AEP 
or GMC.60 
 
 53. Id. at 684. 
 54. Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 55. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (citing McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 470 (10th 
Cir. 1983)). 
 56. Id. at 685–86 (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005)). 
 57. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 58. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 59. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999).  The German 
government later established a foundation specifically empowered to hear such claims.  See In re 
Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 379 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 60. See In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 67; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 
249 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a suit brought against a Bosnian national under the Alien Tort 
Act by victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia was justiciable, noting that “[n]ot every case 
‘touching foreign relations’ is nonjusticiable[,]” and that “cases present[ing] issues that arise in a 
politically charged context . . . does not transform them into cases involving nonjusticiable 
political questions”). 
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Most notably and recently, the Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush, 
denied a political question defense in an Alien Tort Statute61 and 
habeas corpus action by Guantanamo detainees challenging the 
legality of their detention.62  Likewise, the Supreme Court had earlier 
found no political question when it heard a suit brought to direct the 
Secretary of Commerce to restrict trade with Japan for alleged 
violations of the International Whaling Convention.63  Though the 
Court was to deny the injunction the plaintiffs sought, it ruled that 
only “those controversies which revolve around policy choices and 
value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the 
halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch” are barred 
from judicial review.64 
Closer to the AEP and GMC scenarios is the Supreme Court’s 
decision in an early water-quality case, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals 
Corp.65  Ohio invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction over suits by a 
state,66 seeking an injunction against a chemical manufacturer 
allegedly discharging pollutants into its waters.67  Just as in AEP, the 
state asserted a public nuisance.68  While ultimately declining to hear 
the suit as an original jurisdiction action, the Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Harlan, explicitly distinguished suits asserting political 
questions and relied on a series of cases decided by the Court which 
were brought to abate public nuisances with interstate 
consequences.69  Finding no political question, it ruled that “precedent 
leads almost ineluctably to the conclusion that we are empowered to 
resolve this dispute.”70 
This clear, unequivocal rejection of the political question defense 
by the Supreme Court, congruent with the decisions discussed here, 
reveals the illogic of the AEP and GMC anomalies.  The complexity, 
 
 61. 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)). 
 62. Id. at 480–83. 
 63. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 401 U.S. 493 (1971). 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the 
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction”); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (2000) (“The Supreme 
Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . [a]ll actions . . . by a State against 
the citizens of another State . . . .”). 
 67. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 494–95. 
 68. Id. at 495. 
 69. Id. at 496 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)). 
 70. Id. 
Weinberg__final.doc 3/4/2009  3:09:16 PM 
Fall 2008] “POLITICAL QUESTIONS” 163 
or the high stakes, of litigation concerning climate change71 should not 
bar the courts from hearing suits that are in all other respects no 
different from any other action to enjoin a public nuisance.  The 
courts have long and consistently rejected assertions that the 
enactment of regulatory statutes like the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act preempt states from public nuisance actions.72  The fact 
that Congress has failed to seriously address climate change73 reduces, 
not strengthens, the notion that the issue is not justiciable. 
The Supreme Court had no problem ruling that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should consider adopting 
standards to control CO2 as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act.  In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court upheld the state’s standing and went 
on to so direct the Agency.74  If there was no political question in that 
case—the Government seems not to have even advanced that 
argument, and the Court flatly stated that the suit did not “seek 
adjudication of a political question”75—there surely is none where, as 
in AEP and GMC, states use their more traditional and time-honored 
powers to abate a public nuisance. 
IV.  THE BAKER V. CARR CRITERIA 
Justice Brennan’s cogent analysis in Baker v. Carr, after 
discussing and easily distinguishing rulings holding issues involving 
the validity of treaties and the Guaranty Clause to be political 
questions,76 specified several types of suits as nonjusticiable: those 
raising a “question . . . to be decided, by a political branch of 
government coequal with this Court[,]” those posing “risk [of] 
embarrassment of our government abroad, or [of] grave disturbance 
 
 71. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462–63 (2007) (noting EPA’s 
arguments that regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles under the Clean Air 
Act might conflict with current executive branch programs aimed at voluntary emissions 
reductions, and that such regulation might impair the President’s ability to negotiate an 
international climate change agreement). 
 72. See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–500 (1987); Leo v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 805 
(Wash. 1984).  But see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327–32 (1981) (stating that the 
federal common-law of nuisance was preempted by Clean Water Act). 
 73. See, e.g., Rabe et al., supra note 45, at 2–3 (discussing legislative and executive failures 
at the federal level to take action on climate change). 
 74. 127 S. Ct. at 1452–58. 
 75. Id. at 1452. 
 76. 369 U.S. 186, 209–12 (1962). 
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at home,” or those seeking “policy determinations for which judicially 
manageable standards are lacking.”77 
None of these suffices to derail the climate change suits in GMC 
or AEP.  There is plainly no issue in these actions to be decided by 
another branch of government.  That could be said of any public 
nuisance or similar suit seeking judicial relief where administrative 
agencies such as the EPA have failed to act.  The Supreme Court 
explicitly rebuffed an asserted political question defense in Wyandotte 
Chemicals, which raised similar issues.78  The greater stakes here79 
should not lead to an opposite result. 
Nor do these suits pose any risk of embarrassing the United 
States government abroad.  Whatever embarrassment this country 
has suffered from the climate change issue has stemmed from its 
failure to act, i.e., to ratify the Kyoto Agreement,80 not from attempts 
to remedy that failure. 
Little need be said of concern over possible disturbances to the 
government from concerns over climate change.  And there are surely 
judicially manageable standards to enjoin, or award damages for, 
injuries stemming from climate change.81  Whether those remedies are 
warranted is, of course, an issue the courts ought to decide.  They 
should not disqualify themselves by concluding that these concerns 
are not justiciable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The political question doctrine is inapplicable to suits to enjoin, 
or recover damages for, environmental—and particularly climate 
change—injury.  Its use by courts amounts to an unwarranted 
expansion of that limited doctrine into areas where, historically, the 
courts have been available to render justice to aggrieved parties. 
 
 
 77. Id. at 226. 
 78. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496 (1971). 
 79. See supra note 71. 
 80. See Stephen Seplow, Why the U.S. Draws Fire over Kyoto Protocol While Other Nations 
Don’t, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 24, 2001, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/ 
summary_0286-8322358_ITM. 
 81. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) (enjoining air pollution); 
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (damages for environmental harm). 
